The critique and reconstruction of foundationalist theory of justification by 张立英
学校编号：10384                        分类号        密级         
学    号：B200305002                   UDC                        
 
 
博 士 学 位 论 文  
 
基础主义确证论的批判与重构 
The Critique and Reconstruction of  
Foundationalist Theory of Justification 
张 立 英 
指导教师姓名：陈嘉明  教授 
专 业 名 称 ：科学技术哲学 
论文提交时间：2006 年   月 
论文答辩时间：2006 年  月 
学位授予日期：2006 年  月 
答辩委员会主席：             
评    阅    人：             
 


















The Critique and Reconstruction of  
Foundationalist Theory of Justification 
 
 































                声明人（签名）： 























  1、保密（ ），在   年解密后适用本授权书。 




作者签名：      日期：  年 月 日 
































内 容 摘 要 
 














































































Controversies in the field of epistemology exist continuously since the early 1980s. 
The epistemology(or theory of knowledge ), put forward by Plato，has been being studied, 
discussed, and criticized，especially the empirical Foundationalist Theory of Justification 
has been strongly attacked. In fact, in spite of all the differences in the perspectives of the 
opposition parties, they have one point in common: the traditional Foundationalist Theory 
of Justification is an untenable, indeed hopeless position and must be abandoned. In their 
works, those opposition parties criticized this once dominant view in a radical way. They 
hold that if epistemological progress is to be made, this theory must be abandoned. Under 
this situation, the discussions of a large number of epistemologists about the central theme 
of recent Foundationalist Theory of Justification have widely deviated from tradition. 
However, many of those who reject it seem to not have good reasons. I doubt that the 
recent movements away from foundationalism often looks more like a temporary impulse 
and a fashion than being logic, just like many other things which frequently occur in 
philosophy. We are now convinced that rejection of foundationalism is a serious mistake. 
In so doing, on the one hand, epistemology will be put in the wrong direction, and on the 
other hand, those who would reject for the central epistemological project radically will 
be inadequately given undeserved trust. Hence, I hope my subtitle has already made my 
position clear: foundationalism edifice has not collapsed as many critics state. What needs 
for epistemology is renovation and reorientation.  
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one examines the origins of 
the problem. Knowledge has been looked upon as justified true belief since Plato, so if 
true belief is to become knowledge, it must turn on justification. According to the 
tripartite definition of the traditional knowledge, a belief seems to be justified by another 
belief, which makes justification get in an infinite series of regress. There are traditionally 
four schemes for solving epistemic regress problem: （1）terminate in a belief for which 
no justification is available; （2）continue indefinitely ‘backwards’. No belief is 
repeated,and no end is reached; （3）circle back on itself, so that beliefs which have 
already appeared as premises are again appealed to, therefore a reticulation will form ；
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dependent on other beliefs. Obviously, the former two necessarily result in skepticism. 
The foundationalism and coherentism identify with（4）and (3) respectively. 
Chapters 2 to 3 mainly review controversies between foundationalism and 
coherentism. Contemporary foundationalism inherits and develops traditional 
foundationalism, whereas coherentism chiefly criticizes and rebuts Contemporary 
foundationalism. Paying attention to the historical fact requires that when reading 
foundationalism and coherentism, we had better refer to contemporary foundationalism, 
and regard coherentism as the contradictory of foundationalism. In these two chapters we 
analyze and appraise in detail the motivation, way of argument, types of each theory, and 
clarify merits and defects of each one. All kinds of analyses and appraisements in these 
two chapters lay a foundation for the next chapter, which offers more reasonable solution 
to epistemic justification and then the regress problem in the dissertation. 
Chapter 4 is a reflection on the reconstruction of Foundationalist Theory of 
Justification. Both foundationalism and coherentism cannot solve the regress problem, 
which is the reason why Foundationalist Theory of Justification needs reconstructing. 
Some books about epistemology in the near future fall into illusive duality antithesis, 
namely, conflict between foundationalism and coherentism. As the two competing 
theories, foundationalism and coherentism each have strengths and weaknesses relative to 
each other, with each party trying to overcome the difficulties the other thinks insuperable, 
and they have come closer together. I shall be offering a new better theory to solve 
epistemic regress problem than traditional competitors had by improving research 
achievements of contemporary westward epistemology. My new theory is 
“contextual-coherent foundationalism”. It is neither foundationalist nor coherentist in 
structure, but it is an intermediate style of theory that avoids common pitfalls, and 
combines with their respective strengths. This new theory allows experience input, but 
does not require a certain kind of basic belief justified by believer ‘s experience has 
special cognitional status, does not require cognitive one-directionality, but admit mutual 
support among beliefs; As knowledge and justification in some way are related with their 
context, the inference of knowledge truth will be changeable from one context to another. 
Obviously, this theory takes context factors into account. 
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